There is an interesting bit of research coming out of Emory
University about dogs and what is really going on inside their heads. Neuroscientist Gregory Berns has been
successful in training dogs to tolerate having an M.R.I. and the results are
very intriguing, but totally unsurprising to those of us who share our lives
with a canine companion.
In
dogs, we found that activity in the caudate increased in response to hand
signals indicating food. The caudate also activated to the smells of familiar
humans. And in preliminary tests, it activated to the return of an owner who
had momentarily stepped out of view. Do these findings prove that dogs love us?
Not quite. But many of the same things that activate the human caudate, which
are associated with positive emotions, also activate the dog caudate.
Neuroscientists call this a functional homology, and it may be an indication of
canine emotions.
Now there is a scientific underpinning to arguments made by people
like Peter Singer and more recently Tom Regan to name just two, plus, as Berns
points out these results may have value that goes beyond the scientific in
determining the lawful rights of dogs:
I
suspect that society is many years away from considering dogs as persons.
However, recent rulings by the Supreme Court have included neuroscientific
findings that open the door to such a possibility. In two cases, the court
ruled that juvenile offenders could not be sentenced to life imprisonment
without the possibility of parole. As part of the rulings, the court cited
brain-imaging evidence that the human brain was not mature in adolescence.
Although this case has nothing to do with dog sentience, the justices opened
the door for neuroscience in the courtroom.
I agree that we are many years away from facing the
implication of what science is beginning to show us because to do so would call into question some of the fundamental tenants of western Christian culture,
particularly the idea that we have been given “dominion over the fish of the
sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over the cattle, and over all of the
earth, and over every creeping thing that creepeth upon the earth.” (Genesis 1:
24-26). To paraphrase Darth Vader, the hierarchy is strong in this one.
More to the point though, I don’t think the “because they’re
like us” premise of Berns', Singer’s, and to a lesser extent Regan’s arguments
go far enough. It seems to me the determination of what kinds of rights are
given to an animal should not be based on how much they are like us, but the
fact that they are. In his book Animal Rights and Moral Philosophy Julian Franklin pushes beyond the arguments of
Singer and Regan in particular to a reframing and expansion of Kant’s categorical
imperative that provides an ethical argument for the treatment of all sentient
creatures. I’m drawn to that argument,
but I know the issue is still unsettled philosophically (see J. M. Coetzee’s The Lives of Animals).
I would like to make the case for sympathy, which I know is
a term in some philosophical disrepute. Luckily I’m not a philosopher so I
direct the reader to John Fisher’s Taking Sympathy Seriously: A Defense Of Our Moral Psychology Towards Animals (pdf) for a
more extensive discussion. As humans we have the capability for sympathy, but
that capability is not limited to other members of our species. Who hasn’t been affected
by Sarah Mclachlan’s ASPCA commercials, or stories about the suffering of pets
after a natural disaster, or felt that momentary heaviness in the heart when we
see an injured animal?
I think there are important implications to the fact that we
are able to extend our ability to connect with living creatures beyond our
fellow humans, and when, through tradition, or expediency, or denial we ignore
that connection we are ignoring a vital part of our nature—the part that tells
us we are of this planet, not simply on it.
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